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FEDERAL HOUSING HELP FALLS
SHORT: THE HOUSING AND
ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 2008
Evan Page*
INTRODUCTION
T he impact of the subprime mortgage foreclosure crisis on
homeowners is, to put it simply, staggering.1 In July alone,
banks took back 77,295 homes.2 Projections indicate that almost
2.2 million subprime foreclosures will occur primarily late in 20o8
through the end of 2oo9.1 The spillover impact of such foreclosure
rates will result in 40.6 million homes suffering price declines at a
value of 352 billion dollars.4 Nationally this averages out to over
eight thousand dollars in the decrease in home value per unit,
while in Illinois the average exceeds ten-thousand.5 As a result of
this current subprime mortgage crisis, Congress has taken a
number of affirmative steps to help out homebuyers.
The largest and most attention-grabbing maneuver thus
J.D. Candidate, May 2Oo, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
See generally Stan J. Liebowitz, Anatomy of a Trainwreck, The
Independent Institute, Oct. 3, 2008, http://www.independent.org/pdf/
policy-reports/2oo8-i0-03-trainwreck.pdf (for a straightforward discussion of
why the mortgage market failed).
2 Les Christie, Another bad jump in foreclosures in July, Aug. 14, 2oo8,
available at http://money.cnn.com/2oo8/o8/14/realestate/foreclosures-up in
july/index.htm?postversion=2oo8o814o9 (last visited Oct. 5, 2oo8) (The
foreclosure rate jumped up 8% in a month and 183% in a year, according to
reports).
' Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Updated Projections of Subprime
Foreclosures and their Impact on Home Values and Communities, Aug. 2oo8,
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/updated-foreclosure-and-
spillover-brief-8-i8.pdf [hereinafter Updated Projections].
4 Id.
I Id.
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far has been the government takeover of mortgage giants Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac.6 This rescue plan will work in a number
of ways, including:
The Federal Housing Finance Agency will oversee all
operations, and chief executives will be replaced with
significantly lower compensated outsiders;
The government will inject money if liabilities exceed
assets, an assessment made quarterly;
Holders of debts in the companies will be protected
against losses;
No dividends will be issued to shareholders, and the
current shareholders will have their stakes reduced to 20
percent;
The government will receive $i billion worth of stock
from each company that puts taxpayers' interests ahead of
shareholders' interests;
The companies will not be permitted to lobby or
participate in any other political involvement;
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will increase mortgage
funding between now and the end of 2009;
Beginning in 2010, they will reduce the volume of funded
mortgages by io percent per year for ic years, to reduce
risk;
The government will also start a program to buy pools of
mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, in an effort to reduce the interest rates of home
loans.
Despite the pointed focus on the government takeover, a
recent piece of housing legislation, the Housing and Economic
6 How the Rescue Plan Will Work, Wash. Post, Sep. 8, 2008, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2oo8/o 9/o7/AR2008
0907024 85.html?sub=new (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
7 Id.
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Recovery Act of 2oo8 ("HERA"), has been given relatively little
attention.8 President Bush signed the sizable package of housing
legislation into law on July 30, 2006.9 One of the smaller, yet
nevertheless important provisions of the HERA is a tax credit
designed for first-time homebuyers to get the housing market
moving again. 10 This Note will focus on the aforementioned tax
credit, and how it will affect consumers.
Section II will provide a brief overview of the HERA,
including regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and
providing new loans to those at risk of foreclosure. Section III
will move to the first-time homebuyers tax credit, including the
purpose of the credit, eligibility requirements, and argument
against the credit as an effective incentive to bolster the housing
market. Last, section IV will argue that as an alternative to the
tax credit and many parts of the HERA, court-supervised
restructuring of mortgages on families' homes will save more
homes from foreclosure.
II. HOUSING AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT
A. Purpose
The purpose of the HERA is to strengthen and modernize
regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Federal
Home Loan Banks."' The largest portion of the Act creates a new
program at the Federal Housing Administration that will help at
8 Max Baucus, Committee on Finance, Baucus Tax Measure Wins Passage
in Housing Bill, July 26, 2008, available at http://finance.senate.gov/
press/Bpress/2oo8press/prbo726o8.pdf [hereinafter Baucus] ("This is an
enormous win for millions of American families facing foreclosure and for our
housing sector at the core of this economic downturn").
I David Herszenhorn, Bush Signs Sweeping Housing Bill, N.Y. Times,
July 31, 2oo8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/o7/3/business/
31housing.html?-r=2&hp=&adxnnl= i&oref=slogin&adxnnlx= 1220724728-
suIu7vlypJ2X/XyY 3 fYhsQ [hereinafter Herszenhorn] (last visited Nov. 13,
2008).
10 Les Christie, Beware the $7,5o0 'tax credit,' Aug. i8, 2oo8, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2oo8/o8/,5/real-estate/buyers-tax-credit/index.htm
[hereinafter Christie] (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
" U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
Summary of the "Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008,"
http://banking.senate.gov/public/-files/HousingandEconomicRecoveryActSum
mary.pdf [hereinafter Summary of the "Housing and Economic Recovery Act
of 2008"].
2008]
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least 400,000 families prevent foreclosure by providing for new
loans after lenders take deep discounts. 12 Listed below are a
number of provisions that will most affect homeowners at risk of
foreclosure.
B. Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008
A regulator for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Federal
Home Loan Banks, the housing government-sponsored
enterprises (hereinafter "GSEs"), was created in the "Federal
Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 20o8. " 13 Broad
authority is granted this regulator, including the power to:
establish capital standards;
establish prudential management standards, including
internal controls, audits, risk management, and
management of the portfolio;
enforce its orders through cease and desist authority, civil
money penalties, and the authority to remove officers and
directors;
restrict asset growth and capital distributions for
undercapitalized institutions;
put a regulated entity into receivership; and
review and approve new product offerings.14
By raising the loan limits in high cost areas from $417,000
to $625,000, the Act also affords more families the opportunity to
qualify for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans. 15 In addition, the
law raises the United States' debt limit to $io.6 trillion, an
12 Id.
11 Democratic Policy Committee, H.R. 3221, the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008, July 25, 2oo8, available at http://www.dpc.senate.gov/
dpc-new.cfm?docname=lb-i 1o-2-123.
1' Summary of the "Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2oo8", supra
note i i.
15 Id.
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additional $2 trillion.16 The Act also enhances the affordable
housing component of these GSEs by requiring the enterprises to
assist underserved markets, such as rural areas, manufactured
housing, and the preservation market.17 Lastly, the Act creates
funds, financed by contributions for the enterprises, to construct
affordable housing. 18 Though this section of the HERA grants
broad new authority, increases the Nation's debt limit, and raises
the loan limits of GSEs' loans in high cost areas, it is not as
central to preventing foreclosure as the next portion of the
HERA: the HOPE for Homeowners Act of 2008.
C. HOPE for Homeowners Act of 2oo8
Of particular significance to this bill is a Federal Housing
Administration (hereinafter "FHA") program titled the "HOPE
for Homeowners Act of 2o08" that will allegedly help
approximately 400,0o0 homeowners avoid foreclosure.19 In effect,
the program pays off troubled mortgages and replaces them with
more affordable, government-insured loans. 20 A key feature of the
Act is that the lenders of the troubled mortgages agree to take a
significant loss.21 Thus, federal insurance is provided to
refinanced 3o-year mortgages for homeowners struggling to make
payments. This was enacted in light of the fact that past efforts
at voluntary loan modifications have failed to keep up with the
recent wave of foreclosures.23
The program is based on the following principles: long-
term affordability, no investor or lender bailout, no windfalls for
16 Roger Runnigen, Bush Signs Measure for Homeowners, Fannie,
Freddie, Bloomberg, July 30, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=2o6oi Io3&sid=am2yQYThqmxQ&refer=us [hereinafter
Runnigen] (last visited Nov. i3, 2008).
" Summary of the "Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2oo8", supra
note i i.
18 Id.
" Runnigen, supra note i6.
20 Herszenhorn, supra note 9.
21 Id.
22 Runnigen, supra note i6.
23 Allen Fishbein, On the Enactment of the "Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2oo8", July 30, 2008, http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/
CFAStdtementHousingStimulusBillEnactment7 3008.pdf ("The most recent
HOPE NOW Alliance report indicates that almost four times as many families
lost their home or are in the process of losing their home as compared to those
receiving loan modifications.").
2008]
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borrowers, voluntary participation in the program, and
restoration of confidence, liquidity and transparency in the credit
markets.14 Only owner-occupants, and not investors, will qualify,
and they must have a mortgage debt to income ratio greater than
31 percent as of March i, 2008.25 The size of the new federally
insured loan will be the lesser of the amount the borrower can
repay, or 9o percent of the current value of the home. 6
Of important note here is that the borrower must also
share his or her newly-created equity and future appreciation
equally with FHA, until the borrower sells the home or refinances
the mortgage.2 7 From this provision alone, it is apparent that the
American borrower can give up potentially large amounts of
gains in equity and home values if the market does in fact
improve over time. To further put this program in perspective,
the numbers indicate that the program is authorized to insure up
to $30o billion in mortgages.2 8 The program does not last
indefinitely; it sunsets on September 30, 201 1.29
This portion of the HERA may in fact help a number of
families at risk of foreclosure, but there is strong criticism that the
HOPE Act will only make a modest dent in the rate of
foreclosures.3 0 Nothing is created to help those who aren't at risk
of foreclosure but are rather seeing some or even all of their net
worth disappear in a very short period of time.3
D. Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008
An additional Act within the HERA, though not as large
as HOPE or the Federal Finance Housing Regulatory Reform
Act is the "Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008". It is designed to
further assist families and communities in light of the foreclosure
24 Summary of the "Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008", supra
note i i.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Summary of the "Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008", supra
note i i.
30 Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Another Temporary Fix, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2oo8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/o7/28/opinion/28krugman.
html [hereinafter Krugman] (last visited Nov. I3, 2008).
31 Id.
[Vol. 2 1: 2254
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crisis. The Act provides $3.92 billion to communities hit the
hardest by foreclosures and delinquencies, with funds being used
to purchase foreclosed homes and rehabilitate or redevelop such
homes in order to stabilize neighborhoods.33 $i8o million is
provided to counsel families on avoiding foreclosure and to
provide legal services to distressed borrowers. 34 Last, a provision
is included to help returning soldiers avoid foreclosure, whereby
the time a lender must wait to start foreclosure is lengthened from
three months to nine months, giving returning soldiers one year of
relief from increases in mortgage interest rates.35
The Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act,
HOPE for Homeowners Act, and Foreclosure Prevention Act are
all honest attempts at preventing foreclosure, and each serves
HERA's broader goal of strengthening the currently tumultuous
housing and credit markets. A critical aspect of the HERA that is
of more interest to this note, however, is the package of tax
measures within the HERA, which will be discussed below.
II. TAX MEASURES
A. Housing Rescue Credit Structure
An important section within the HERA that alters the tax
treatment of many homeowners is the "Housing Assistance Tax
Act of 20o8. ' '36 Like the HERA, the tax package aims to help
homeowners and potential buyers obtain affordable loans. 37 The
cost of this tax package to the nation is approximately $15 billion
over ten years.3 8 The most significant portion of this tax package
in terms of cost is the refundable first-time home buyer credit,
32 Summary of the "Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008", supra
note i i.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 CCH Inc., "CCH Tax Briefing: Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008,"
July 30, 2008, http://tax.cchgroup.com/legislation/2008-Housing-Assistance-
Act.pdf?cm-sp-o=iwTblkzfbBE%2oVzTwCjCZBAlw%20Vzllwl%20ftw%20
ZBAlbET%2o-llblfzEgw%2oazo%20-gf%2oBu%2oniioCjCawof%2okbEL
[hereinafter CCH, Inc.] (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
3' Baucus, supra note 8. ("...I'm pleased to say that we passed a bill that
will bring property tax relief to tens of millions of homeowners, help refinance
subprime loans, and reduce the number of vacant homes on the market.").
38 Id.
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estimated at $4.853 billion.39  However, the credit's true
immediate impact is much larger, since homeowners are
predicted to claim the credit at a cost of $13.6 billion in 2009.40
Other tax provisions included in the Act, but not discussed
in this note, include: additional standard deductions for real
property taxes, an enhanced low-income housing tax credit,
increased mortgage revenue bonds, REIT reforms, merchant
payment card information reporting, reduced home sale
exclusion, delayed worldwide interest allocation, and an
acceleration of large-corporation estimated tax.4
The drafters of the Act, in an attempt to offset the large
cost of the package, included provisions requiring that banks
provide information reporting annual credit card sales to the IRS
and to merchants, that homeowners pay taxes on gains made
from the sale of a second home to reflect the portion of time the
home was used as either a vacation or rental property, and that
there be a delay in implementation of worldwide allocation of
interest, i.e. a tax benefit for businesses.
B. First-Time Homebuyer Credit
The first-time homebuyer credit is not a completely new
tax idea; for instance, a similar program was utilized in the
District of Columbia up until 2o0o8. 43 Under the credit in the
HERA, there are, at first blush, valuable benefits to a first-time
homebuyer. A taxpayer who is a first-time homebuyer is allowed
a refundable tax credit equal to the lesser of $7,500 or io percent
of the purchase price of a principal residence.44 This provision
applies exclusively to homes purchased on or after April 9, 20o8
and before July i, 2009.45 A taxpayer is considered a "first-time
homebuyer" if, during the three years preceding their tax credit
39 Id.
40 CCH Inc., supra note 36 at i.
41 Summary of the "Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 20o8", supra
note i i.
•42 Baucus, supra note 8.
43 Joint Committee on Taxation, Technical Explanation of Division C of
H.R. 3221, the "Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2oo8," 25, July 23, 2oo8,
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-63-o8.pdf [hereinafter Joint Committee on
Taxation] ("...first-time homebuyers of a principal residence in the District of
Columbia were eligible for a nonrefundable tax credit of up to $5,ooo of the
amount of the purchase price.").
44 Id.
45 Baucus, supra note 8.
[Vol. 2 1: 2256
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claim, they had no ownership interest in a principal residence.46
Additionally, the credit phases out for individual taxpayers with
modified adjusted gross incomes between $75,00o and $95,000 for
the year of purchase of the principal residence. The Senate
Finance Committee estimates that about 1.6 million people-will
make use of the credit.48
Thus far, the tax credit appears to give first-time
homebuyers up to $7,500 worth of help on their loan.4 9 However,
as with many tax credits, there are certain limits to claiming the
credit. First, the credit may not be claimed if the taxpayer's
financing is from tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds.50 Second,
nonresident aliens do not qualify for the credit.51 Third, if the
taxpayer either disposes of the residence or ceases to make it a
principal residence before the close of a taxable year for which
the credit is allowed, then the credit cannot be claimed." Thus, if
a homeowner claims the credit and then subsequently sells or
turns the home into a secondary residence during the year the
credit is claimed, he or she will have to pay back the credit. Also
important to note is that the IRS is not giving the credit as cash at
closing; rather, an individual wishing to utilize the credit must
claim it on their tax return. 53 For example, if an individual's tax
liability were normally $io,ooo, they would pay only $2,500 if
they claimed the credit.
C. Beware the Credit's True Nature
The biggest and most misleading aspect of the tax credit
here, however, is that it is more akin to a loan than a tax credit.
This is because the credit is recaptured over fifteen years
beginning in the second taxable year after the year in which the
home was purchased. 54 Put simply, the credit given to qualifying
first-time homebuyers must be repaid over fifteen years in an
interest-free loan of sorts. This credit is unlike any other federal
" Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 43, at 26.
41 Id. at 25.
48 Christie, supra note I.
41 Summary of the "Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008", supra
note i i.
50 Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 43, at 26.
51 Id.
s2 Id.
51 CCH Inc., supra note 36 at 2.
14 Id.
2008] 257
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tax credit in that it must be paid back.55
If the credit must be paid back, then how will it really get
the housing market moving again? One argument is that
mortgage lenders will take the tax credit into consideration,
which will in turn make it easier for buyers to get loans.56 The
main argument for this credit is that it will prevent more
borrowers from defaulting on their payments, since it gives them
a nest egg should they run into financial trouble down the road.5
However, both of these pro-credit arguments are based on the
assumption that the credit will be saved rather than spent.
D. Tax Credit Criticism
Despite the favorable arguments that the credit will make
lenders more willing to grant loans to buyers and that it will
prevent homeowners from falling into default, there are enough
overriding factors to make this tax credit not only ineffective, but
dangerous as well. The back story to the current housing crisis
will be discussed, followed by arguments against the tax credit.
Over recent years, traditional banks have been pushed
aside by unregulated financial players.58 Traditional banks are
those with federally insured deposits, which have limits on the
risk they can take and the amount of leverage they can take on.59
The unregulated financial players here have no such federal
insurance, and assume more risk in their lending practices.
Borrowers were assured that the market itself would impose
discipline risk-taking by these companies, yet that was simply not
the case; such lenders disregarded the ability of borrowers to
repay.60
As house prices soared to seemingly unrealistic levels,
lenders ignored the warning signs, both because many mortgage
originators did not care about the solvency of borrowers, and
because the loans were quickly sold off to investors who had no
idea what they were buying.61 At its core, a financial framework
of fast and loose lending by lenders who should have known
better to lenders who took on more than they could afford has
55 Id.
56 Christie, supra note 9.
57 Id.
5 Krugman, supra note 28.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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ultimately led the housing market to its current degenerated state.
One of the key problems with this tax credit is that it is
considered a credit for tax purposes, but has to be repaid like a
loan.62 Because of the misleading nature of this credit, it may
appear to be free money to many consumers who claim the
credit.63 If consumers treat the credit as though it is a free gift
from the government, and spending it as though it does not have
to be repaid, then even more financial difficulties may lie down
the road when the credit must be repaid. Though the repayment
is over a period of fifteen years, equaling out to $500 per year if
the full $7500 is claimed, the credit nonetheless represents
another risky loan given to families already at risk of foreclosure.
Further methods of risky lending such as this tax credit are the
types of lending that paved the way for the current housing
market, and should not be encouraged by the government.
Given that many lenders have been too loose in their
dealings with borrowers, and conversely buyers have been taking
on loans they cannot afford, then why should another loan
labeled as a "credit" be given to such homeowners? These
irresponsible practices have caused the subprime mortgage
crisis.64 Taking another chance on borrowers who were
irresponsible in the first place by assuming debts they could not
relieve themselves of is just another risky bet. Unfortunately, if
taxpayers who claim the credit ultimately end up not being able
to pay it back, then the remaining taxpayers end up footing the
bill.65
Even if homeowners who utilize the credit do indeed pay
it back in full, the credit is hardly a solution to the crisis, and is
merely a temporary fix.66 One of the reasons that this tax credit is
only a temporary fix is that plummeting home prices will block
any impact that the credit may have; the market is too soft right
now for a modest tax credit to make any real difference.
Another challenge to the effectiveness of this credit is that of
612 CCH Inc., supra note 36 at 2.
63 Christie, supra note io.
64 Krugman, supra note 30.
6' Herszenhorn, supra note 9. ("The bill raises the national debt ceiling to
$io.6 trillion, an increase of $800 billion.. .and the Federal Housing
Administration's authority, granted in the new legislation, to insure up to $300
billion in refinanced mortgages to help stem a tide of foreclosures.").
66 Christie, supra note io. ("Given the economy, it will only push a precious
few first-time home buyers over the edge right now.")
67 Id.
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willingness to buy in the housing market.68 Specifically, the
current market has a psychological barrier because consumer
believe prices will be lower tomorrow, a barrier the credit may
not be able to overcome.69 . Last, even some leaders in the
government do not feel confident about both the effectiveness of
this bill and that there will be no loss to the taxpayer.7 °
Granted, homeowners at risk of foreclosure need help
from the government. Lawmakers claim that these tax measures
in the HERA are targeted, practical measures that are what's
right for the economy and working American families.7' This may
be true to an extent, but the modest tax measures are not enough
to make a difference in this ailing housing market. Furthermore,
the tax credit that is recaptured is not large enough to make a
difference when housing prices are plummeting."
A solution to this crisis is expanding financial regulation to
cover a much wider range of institutions.73 Fortunately, Congress
recognized this need for expanded regulation and placed Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac under conservatorship, with the goal of
restructuring the companies. 74 There is, however, another method
of preventing foreclosure that was not passed by Congress: court-
supervised loan modifications, which will be discussed below.
IV. COURT-SUPERVISED LOAN MODIFICATIONS
A. The Callfor Change in Current Law
Efforts to encourage voluntary loan modification in the
housing market have failed to keep up with the increase in
foreclosures.7" Even with the addition of the HOPE for
Homeowners Act in the HERA, court-supervised loan
modifications are a much-needed complement to industry
initiated voluntary efforts.76 Sometimes such loan-modifications
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Runnigen, supra note i6. (HUD Secretary Preston stating, "Roughly a
third of the people who get this assistance will end up in foreclosure.. .and
many more, we believe, will be chronic delinquencies.").
71 Baucus, supra note 8 at 2.
72 Christie, supra note io.
7' Krugman, supra note 30.
How the Rescue Plan Will Work, supra note 6.
7 Fishbein, supra note 23.
76 Id.
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are the only available option to some of the challenges lenders
face, such as when second liens exist.77
Under current law, homeowners at risk of foreclosure are
denied equal access to court-supervised loan modifications.7 ' A
primary residence is often the most important asset to families,
yet under current law judicial modification of loans under a
chapter 13 payment plan is allowed for owners of commercial real
estate and even yachts. 9 Surprisingly, mortgages on primary
residences are the only types of debts not subject to judicial
modification. 0 Such mortgage loans must be paid off.according to
their original terms or else the bankruptcy automatic stay will be
lifted, permitting the mortgagee to foreclose on the property.8 ' At
the same time, lenders who could modify loans to make them
affordable to borrowers are simply not doing so.8
In response to the subprime mortgage foreclosure crisis,
H.R. 3609: The Emergency Home Ownership and Mortgage
Equity Protection Act of 2007, was reported out of the House
Judiciary Committee on December 12, 2007.3 Though the bill has
yet to be enacted, it is nonetheless an effective bill that allows for
judicial modification loans in order to allow borrowers to avoid
foreclosure. The passing of this bill, or one similar in nature to it,
would help families stuck in bad loans keep their homes. 4
77 Id.
71 Ctr. for Responsible Lending, HR 3609 - Compromise Bill Permitting
Court-Supervised Loan Modifications Would Save 6ooooo Homes, Jan. 18,
2008, at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/hr-36o9-support-brief.pdf
[hereinafter Ctr. for Responsible Lending].
79 II U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
s0 Ctr. for Responsible Lending, supra note 78.
81 InsuranceNewsNet, Georgetown Law Center Study Finds Zero Percent'
Likelihood of MBA-Claimed Interest Rate Spike Under Mortgage Foreclosure
Crisis Bills Before Congress, Feb. 7, 2008, at http://insurancenewsnet.com/
article.asp?n = i &neID=20080207168o.2-e5 oboo8f37cbff62 [hereinafter
Georgetown Law Center Study] ("As a result, if a debtor's financial distress
stems from a home mortgage, bankruptcy is unable to help the debtor retain
her home, and foreclosure will occur.").
82 Ctr. for Responsible Lending, supra note 78. ("A report by Moody's
found that loan servicers had only modified 3.5 percent of mortgages that
increased to higher rates, compared with industry estimates that up to half of
subprime borrowers facing reset will lose their homes to foreclosure.").
3 Id.; See H.R. 3609, iioth Cong. (2007).
84 Ctr. for Responsible Lending, supra note 78.
2oo8]
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B. Qualifications for Relief
First and foremost, judicial modification would only be
available when a homeowner lacks the sufficient income to pay
their mortgage, and foreclosure is imminent.85 This would be
determined by deducting modest living expenses allowed by the
IRS, to see if their income is insufficient to cover their mortgage
obligations; also, they must have received notice from their lender
that foreclosure is imminent.86 This strict test allows for a tapered
targeting of families who would otherwise lose their homes.
Accordingly, the court-supervised loan modification would not be
granted to homeowners who do not need such assistance. As an
additional incentive to lenders, lenders could not recover any
more than the market value of the home when foreclosure
happens, and typically recovers far less than that, whereas with a
judicial modification more would be recovered by lenders."
. Next, courts would be required to set interest rates at a
reasonable market rate, calculated by the current 30-year
conventional fixed rate plus a reasonable risk premium.8" Judicial
discretion would be further limited in that the principal balance
of the loan cannot be reduced below the fair market value of the
property, and that the 30-year term would remain unchanged. 9
Another key limitation on judicial discretion is that courts could
modify existing loans only, and new loans would not be subject to
modification.9"
Conventional fixed-rate and adjustable rate loans would
not be eligible for modification.9' The two categories of loans that
regulators have determined to be potentially dangerous in light of
poor underwriting by lenders that would be subject to
modification are subprime and non-traditional loans.9 Last, the
bill would apply only to loans originated on or after January i,
2000, and would be subject to a seven-year sunset.9 3
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
19 Ctr. for Responsible Lending, supra note 78.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. (Non-traditional loans in this sense means interest-only loans and
payment option adjustable-rate mortgages.).
93 Ta
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C. Benefits, Response to Objections
It is possible for a law such as H.R. 3609 to save over
5 70,000 families from losing their homes due to foreclosure.94 This
calculation is based on the number of homeowners who face an
interest rate reset through the end of the decade that would meet
the means test required in a Chapter 13 and are still current on
their mortgage loans.95 The number of homes that could avoid
foreclosure through this method may be even higher in light of
the updated projections indicating that almost 2.2 million
subprime foreclosures will occur primarily late in 2o08 through
the end of 2009.96
In addition to helping those who are at risk of foreclosure,
court-supervised loan modification would stabilize property
values for families who live near homes at risk of foreclosure-,
saving Americans an estimated $72.5 billion in home values.97
This is because foreclosures have a significant impact on
neighborhood property values, whereby each foreclosure of a
conventional mortgage within an eighth of a mile results in a
decline between 0.9 and 1.136 percent.98 For example, if a house
goes into foreclosure, then a residence with a fair market value of
$ioo,ooo would decline somewhere between $900 and $1136 in
value.
Another great benefit would be that the court-supervised
loan modifications would come at no cost to the U.S. Treasury. 99
The modifications would avoid any potential abuses by narrowly
targeting only those borrowers who would otherwise lose their
homes, and would not assist families not at risk of foreclosure as
defined by the law.' ° Last, in terms of helping lenders as well as
borrowers in this crisis, lenders would be guaranteed the value
they would obtain through foreclosure, given that foreclosure
" The Looming Foreclosure Crisis: How To Help Families Save Their
Homes: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, iioth Cong. (2007)
(written statement of Mark Zandi, Chief Economist and Co-Founder, Moody's
Economy.com) [hereinafter Zandi].
95 Id.
96 Updated Projections, supra note 3.
9 Ctr. for Responsible Lending, supra note 78.
98 Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, There Goes the Neighborhood: The
Effect of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, Woodstock
Institution, June 2005, http://www.woodstockinst.org/content/view/104/47/
(last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
" Ctr. for Responsible Lending, supra note 78.
... Zandi, supra note 94.
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sales can only recover the fair market value of the home; lenders
would also avoid the high costs and significant delays involved in
the foreclosure process. 1°1
This type of loan modification is also preferable to the
HOPE for Homeowners Act in certain aspects. The main
argument for loan modifications is that there is no cost to the U.S.
Treasury in such a system of court-supervised loan
modifications.10 2 On the other hand, with the HOPE for
Homeowners Act, the federal government is authorized to assume
up to $300 billion in mortgages.103 Additionally, borrowers must
also share their newly-created equity and future appreciation
equally with FHA, until the borrower sells the home or refinances
the mortgage, whereas no such requirement exists with court-
supervised loan modifications.0 4 Moreover, in terms of the sheer
estimates as to how many homes will avoid f6reclosure, 400,000
will be saved through the HOPE for Homeowners Act, compared
to 6oo,ooo by court-supervised loan modifications. 5
The main argument made against court-supervised loan
modifications is that such modifications would make credit less
available and consequently have a negative impact on interest
rates. 106 This claim is compellingly refuted by three points of data.
First, courts have been modifying mortgage loans on farms,
commercial real estate, vacation homes and investor properties
for decades with no negative effects on credit in these markets.10 7
They may even make credit more available, since debt secured by
all of these asset types, such as farms, commercial real estate, etc.,
is more readily able to be secured, despite the fact that they can
101 Ctr. for Responsible Lending, supra note 78.
102 Id.
103 Summary of the "Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2oo8", supra
note i i.
104 Id.
105 Runnigen, supra note 16.
106 Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Objections to HR 36o9- Myth v. Reality,
(Mar. 1o, 2oo8), at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/bankruptcy-myth-
v-reality-hr36og-final-3-8-o8.pdf [hereinafter Objections to HR 36o9].
I"7 Id. (While interest rates are generally higher on investment properties
than primary residences, this is due to the increased credit risk associated with
lending to investors, whereas an owner of a primary residence must live
somewhere, and the amount that otherwise would have gone to rent can be
applied to the mortgage; in contrast, an investor who cannot find a tenant and
lacks sufficient resources to cover the mortgage payments.. is at greater risk of
default.).
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be modified in bankruptcy.108
Second, from 1978 to 1993 when many courts across the
country were granted authority to modify loans by treating them
as secured up to the value of the property, those jurisdictions
experienced no adverse effects on the cost or availability of
credit.10 9
Third, and most important here, is that the cost of credit
has the risk that some loans will end in loss of the home to
foreclosure already incorporated. 10 In turn, law that provides for
modifications only in cases of homes that will be lost to
foreclosure without such loan modifications, will impose no
additional risk and cost because modification which allows
lenders to recover at least as much through modification as in
foreclosure is preferable to the cost associated with foreclosure.1 I
To further eliminate any concern that loan modifications would
negatively impact the cost or availability of new loans, loan
modifications would be allowed for existing loans only." 2
Not surprisingly, the claim that court-supervised loan
modifications would make credit less available and/or more
expensive is advocated by the financing industry, namely the
Mortgage Bankers Association.113 However, there is no empirical
evidence that court-supervised loan modifications would have
more than a minor impact on mortgage interest rates or home
ownership rates. 114
A similar argument against court-supervised loan
modifications is that modifying the interest rates and/or principal
108 Id.
109 See Adam J. Levitin & Joshua Goodman, The Effect of Bankruptcy
Strip-Down on Mortgage Markets (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Bus., Econ.
and Regulatory Policy Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 1o87816),
available at http://works.bepress.com/adam-levitin/ii (last visited Oct. 5,
2oo8).
110 Objections to HR 3609, supra note io6.
1 Id.
112 Id.
113 Georgetown Law Center Study, supra note 8I. ("The Mortgage Bankers
Association has claimed that permitting modification of mortgages in
bankruptcy will result in an effective 200 basis point increase in interest rates
on single-family owner-occupied properties.").
114 Id. ("As there is significant evidence that mortgage interest rate markets
are indifferent to bankruptcy modification risk, we conclude that permitting
unlimited strip-down would have no or little effect overall on mortgage
interest rates.., lenders' losses in strip-down would be extremely limited both
in scope and magnitude and often total less than those they would incur in
foreclosure").
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balances of outstanding loans is unfair to lenders.11 The opposite
here is true; modifications would be designed so that lenders
actually recover more than they would under foreclosure." 6
Under foreclosure, lenders typically recover approximately 40.%
of the principal balance." 7 This recovery is guaranteed because
the only borrowers eligible for modification would otherwise go
into foreclosure, and the law would permit the write-down of
loan balances to the fair market value of the home.' In the case
of foreclosure, any portion of the loan that exceeds the proceeds of
the foreclosure sale cannot be recovered by the lender. Whereas
any excess under a court-supervised loan modification would be
treated as unsecured debt which would be paid back to the
lender." 9
An additional argument made by opponents of court-
supervised loan modifications is that such modifications are
inappropriate because they shield borrowers from any impact of
their poor decision to take on a loan that they could not afford.'
Granted, a moral hazard may be created by assisting these
borrowers at risk of foreclosure, but this hazard is greatly
outweighed by the need to subdue the subprime mortgage crisis
that would harm not only the borrowers but innocent consumers,
since widespread foreclosures hurt not only the defaulting
borrowers, but neighbors as well.''
V. CONCLUSION
The HERA, considered to be the most significant housing
legislation in decades, implements a number of programs to curb
the alarming rate of foreclosures in America, namely the Federal
Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act and the HOPE for
Homeowners Act. Of particular interest to the HERA is the first-
115 Objections to HR 3609, supra note io6.
116 Id.
17 Business Wire, Fitch Smartview: i7o U.S. Subprime RMBS
Transactions Placed Under Analysis, Jul. 12, 2007, available at http://www.
businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.jsp?ndmViewId--newsview&newsl
d=2007o7I2oo6007&newsLang=en (last visited Nov. 13, 2008) ("First lien loss
severity assumptions reflect the performance to-date, resulting in projected
lifetime loss severity averaging approximately 40%.").
118 Objections to HR 3609, supra note io6.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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time homebuyers tax credit. Though the tax credit may help some
homebuyers avoid foreclosure in the short run, the credit must be
repaid and will unlikely give the housing market the jump start
necessary to bounce back from its recent contraction. Many of the
existing foreclosures result from risky lending to individuals who
could not afford the adjustable-rate-mortgage payment increases,
or made unwise use of their home equity. Consequently, the tax
credit which is another risky loan, is not the best way to get the
market moving again. A better -way to do so is through court-
supervised restructuring of mortgages on family's homes. This
method would save more homes than would the first-time
homebuyers tax credit, and would come at no cost to the United
States Treasury.
